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I.   INTRODUCTION
Of all the roles one plays in life, that of being a parent is perhaps
the most important. The role requires a huge commitment of time
and emotional support. However, when a parent is unable to meet a
child’s basic needs due to neglect or abuse, the best interests of the
child may necessitate the revocation or termination of the parent’s
right to custody of the child. In these crucial cases, a court, upon
finding a parent to be unfit, may terminate the parent’s parental
rights.1
Many statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist in
Florida.2 However, cases may arise where termination is warranted
but unavailable because the particular situation is not covered by a
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1. See FLA. STAT. § 39.464 (1997). Section 39.464 allows petitions for the termina-
tion of parental rights to be filed by the Department of Children and Families, a guardian
ad litem, a licensed child-placing agency, or “any person who has knowledge of the facts
alleged or who is informed of said facts and believes that they are true.” Id. § 39.464(1)(a)-
(f).
2. See, e.g., id. § 39.464(1)(a)-(e); infra text accompanying note 13.
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statute. In 1997, the Florida Legislature considered such a case, and
in response, enacted chapter 97-226, Florida Laws, adding incar-
ceration to the list of statutory grounds for termination of parental
rights.3 The new statute requires that the incarceration be for a sub-
stantial portion of the child’s life.4 Furthermore, the court must deem
the parent to be either a violent career criminal, a habitual felony of-
fender, a sexual predator, or to have been convicted of a sexual bat-
tery constituting a capital, life, or first degree felony or a substan-
tially similar offense in another jurisdiction.5 Additionally, the court
must determine by clear and convincing evidence that it would be
harmful to the child for the parent-child relationship to continue.6
This Article examines Florida’s new termination of parental
rights statute from a constitutional and judicial economy perspec-
tive. Part II discusses the grounds for termination available prior to
the new statute, and the events leading to the new statute’s enact-
ment. Part III provides a summary of the requirements of the new
statute. Part IV provides a constitutional analysis of the new stat-
ute, considering both substantive and procedural due process issues.
Part V examines the effect the new statute will have on the judici-
ary. Part VI highlights potential problems with the new statute. Fi-
nally, Part VII concludes that despite its potential problems and un-
certainty, the new statute is a welcome addition to the ongoing effort
to protect Florida’s children from harm.
II.   THE ROAD TO FLORIDA’S INCARCERATION-AS-GROUNDS-FOR-
TERMINATION STATUTE
A.   Termination of Parental Rights Prior to the New Statute
Because termination of parental rights is a serious, permanent
step, it occurs only under narrowly defined circumstances in Flor-
ida.7 Section 39.464, Florida Statutes , details the grounds and proc-
esses surrounding voluntary and involuntary termination of paren-
tal rights.8
Voluntary termination of parental rights occurs when a parent
executes a written surrender and consents to an order transferring
custody of the child to the Department of Children and Families
(Department), or to a licensed child-placing agency for subsequent
                                                                                                                   
3. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-226, 1997 Fla. Laws 3926 (amending FLA.
STAT. §§ 39.464 (grounds for termination of parental rights), 39.469 (powers of disposition;
order of disposition), 39.471 (oaths, records, and confidential information), 61.13 (custody
following divorce) (1995)).
4. See FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(d)(1) (1997).
5. See id. § 39.464(1)(d)(2).
6. See id. § 39.464(1)(d)(3).
7. See id. § 39.464(1)(a)-(f).
8. See id.
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adoption.9 The Department or agency must be willing to accept cus-
tody of the child.10 This is a relatively simple process compared to in-
voluntary termination.
Petitioners permitted to seek involuntary termination of parental
rights include the Department, a guardian ad litem, a licensed child-
placing agency, or any person who has knowledge of or is informed of
the stated facts and believes that such facts contain merit.11 The pe-
titioner seeking termination must meet certain requirements. First,
the petitioner must file a petition in circuit court alleging one or
more of the statutory grounds for termination.12 Prior to enactment
of the new statute, grounds for involuntary termination included
when the identity or location of the parents was unknown and could
not be ascertained; when the life or well-being of the child was
threatened by the parents, irrespective of the provision of services;
when the parents engaged in egregious conduct that threatened the
life, health, or safety of the child or the child’s siblings, or when the
parent knowingly failed to prevent such conduct; and when the par-
ents continued to abuse, neglect, or abandon the child after the child
had been adjudicated dependent and a case plan had been filed with
the court.13
In addition, the petitioner must demonstrate that the parents of
the child were informed of their right to counsel and that a court
previously adjudicated the child dependent.14 Moreover, the peti-
tioner must demonstrate that the best interests of the child would be
served by granting the petition.15 If the court finds that the grounds
stated in the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evi-
                                                                                                                   
9. See id. § 39.464(1)(a).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. § 39.464(1)(a)-(e).
13. See id.
14. See id. § 39.4611(1)(b) (noting that the parents must have been offered a case
plan, or a plan of rehabilitation, as described in FLA. STAT. § 39.464).
15. See id. § 39.4611(1)(c). Courts consider the following factors when determining
the best interests of the child: (1) whether a permanent relative placement is available for
the child; (2) whether the parents are willing and able to provide the child with the requi-
site food, clothing, shelter, and medical care; (3) whether the child’s well-being will be en-
dangered if reunified with the parents; (4) whether the child’s mental and physical health
needs can be met in the future; (5) whether the child would suffer harm by terminating
the love, affection, and other emotional ties with the parents; (6) whether an older child is
likely to remain in long-term foster care; (7) whether the child can form significant rela-
tionships with a parental substitute and enter into a more stable environment; (8)
whether the child has lived in a stable environment for an extended period of time and
whether it is desirable to maintain this continuity; (9) whether the child and the person
with present custody have a strong relationship; (10) whether the court deems the child to
be sufficiently intelligent to understand the situation to express a preference; (11)
whether the child provides a recommendation to the guardian ad litem or legal represen-
tative. See id. § 39.4612.
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dence, it must place the child in the custody of either the Depart-
ment or a licensed child-placing agency for subsequent adoption.16
Typically, when a court terminates the parental rights of one par-
ent, it terminates the rights of the other parent.17 However, under
certain circumstances a court may terminate the parental rights of
one parent while leaving the other parent’s rights intact.18 These cir-
cumstances include when the child has one surviving parent, when
the prospective parent’s location is unknown, when the parent in
question obtains such rights through a single-parent adoption, and
when it is necessary for the child’s protection.19
While Florida’s statutes address a variety of circumstances under
which it is appropriate to terminate parental rights, they do not ad-
dress all situations that demand parental rights be terminated. Sec-
tion 39.469, Florida Statutes,  addresses one such situation that until
1997 was not included within the statutory grounds for termination
of parental rights: termination of parental rights based solely on in-
carceration.20
Prior to the passage of the new statute, the non-incarcerated par-
ent could attempt to petition the court for termination of the incar-
cerated parent’s rights on the grounds of abandonment.21 Florida
courts, however, have consistently held that incarceration, in and of
itself, does not constitute abandonment.22 Therefore, an incarcerated
                                                                                                                   
16. See id. § 39.469(2)(b)(2).
17. See id. § 39.469(4).
18. See id. § 39.469(4)(a)-(d).
19. See id.
20. See id. § 39.464(1)(d)(1)-(3). The new statute applies when the parent of a child is
incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and:
1. The period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will
constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will at-
tain the age of 18 years;
2. The incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be a violent ca-
reer criminal as defined in s. 775.084, a habitual violent felony offender as de-
fined in s. 775.084, or a sexual predator as defined in s. 775.21; has been con-
victed of first degree or second degree murder in violation of s. 782.04 or a sex-
ual battery that constitutes a capital, life, or first degree felony violation in an-
other jurisdiction which is substantially similar to one of the offenses listed in
this paragraph . . . .
3. The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the
parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the
child and, for this reason, that termination of the parental rights of the incar-
cerated parent is in the best interest of the child.
Id.
21. See id. § 39.464(1) (noting that any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged
may petition for the termination of parental rights).
22. See, e.g., B.W. v. Department of HRS, 498 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1986) (declining to
find abandonment where the incarcerated father, though unable to provide financial sup-
port for his children, still attempted to maintain contact with them); Harden v. Thomas,
329 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (declining to find abandonment despite the fa-
ther’s life sentence).
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parent could retain his or her parental rights even if the non-
incarcerated parent argued that such rights might not be in the best
interests of the child.23 After learning of one family’s story, Florida
lawmakers moved to include incarceration for certain offenses as a
statutory ground for the termination of parental rights.24
B.   The Spradley Case
In August 1990, Kim Spradley married John Edward Taylor fol-
lowing the birth of their son, Justin.25 The marriage collapsed soon
thereafter, and Kim moved with Justin into the apartment of her
close friend, Lisa Kessler.26 Taylor began stalking Spradley, begging
her to return to him.27 Enraged at his inability to convince his es-
tranged wife to return home, Taylor broke into Lisa Kessler’s apart-
ment early on Thanksgiving morning, 1990, and thrust a knife into
Kessler’s neck eight times.28 As a result of the wounds inflicted by
Taylor, Kessler died, yet Taylor remained free for almost a year fol-
lowing the murder while police investigated the situation.29 At his
and Spradley’s divorce hearing, he was charged with first degree
murder and burglary.30 He was convicted and sentenced to life in
prison.31
When Kim Spradley remarried, she and her new husband were
adamant that Justin not know about his natural father.32 The
Spradleys sought to have Justin’s last name changed to Spradley
when he reached school age, but Taylor, imprisoned at Marion Cor-
rectional Institution, fought the request and won.33 He also filed for
visitation and shared parental responsibility.34 The Spradleys did
not want Justin to visit Taylor in prison because they did not believe
the contact to be in Justin’s best interest.35 They based this belief on
the report of a child psychologist who had interviewed Justin and de-
termined that because Justin believed Spradley was his natural fa-
                                                                                                                   
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See Twila Decker, Mom Tries to Keep Son From a Killer: His Dad, ORLANDO
SENT., Feb. 2, 1997, at A1 (detailing the story of Justin Taylor, who’s father was incarcer-
ated for committing murder).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. (noting that Taylor will not be eligible for parole until 2015).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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ther, he would suffer emotional trauma if told about Taylor.36 How-
ever, under Florida law, Kim Spradley had no legal recourse avail-
able to keep Justin from his father.
News of the Spradleys’ situation reached Representative Evelyn
Lynn.37 Moved by the Spradleys’ plight, Representative Lynn spon-
sored House Bill 1111,38 which would permit courts to terminate the
parental rights of parents incarcerated for certain offenses.39 On May
30, 1997, the bill passed as chapter 97-226, Florida Laws.40 Florida
has now joined the growing ranks of states that allow incarceration
as a ground for termination of parental rights.41
III.   A SUMMARY OF FLORIDA’S INCARCERATION-AS-GROUNDS-FOR
TERMINATION STATUTE
For the new statute to apply, the parent must be incarcerated in a
state or federal institution for a “substantial portion” 42 of time before
                                                                                                                   
36. See Lori Horvitz, Defiant Mom Refuses to Tell Son About Father, DAYTONA NEWS-
J., Dec. 16, 1996, at A1.
37. Repub., Ormond Beach
38. Fla. HB 1111 (1997).
39. See Decker, supra note 24, at A1.
40. Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-226, 1997 Fla. Laws 3926 (amending FLA. STAT.
§§ 39.464, 39.469, 39.471, 61.13 (1995)). The statute was enacted without the Governor’s
signature. See id. at 3932.
41. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(a)(4) (1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-533(B)(4) (1997)
(providing for termination of parental rights when the parent is “deprived of civil liberties
due to conviction of a felony . . . if the sentence of such parent is of such length that the
child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7825
(West 1997) (noting that the proceeding “may be brought where . . . [t]he child is one
whose parent or parents are convicted of a felony” and “the crime of which the parent or
parents were convicted . . . prove[s] the unfitness of the parent or parents to have the fu-
ture custody and control of the child”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(III) (1997)
(stating that when determining the unfitness of the parent, the court shall consider the
“[l]ong-term confinement of the parent of such duration that the parent is not eligible for
parole for at least six years after the date the child was adjudicated dependent or ne-
glected”); GA. CODE § 15-11-81(b)(4)(B)(iii) (1997) (courts may consider “a demonstrable
negative effect on the quality of the parent-child relationship”); IOWA CODE §
232.116(1)(i)(2) (1997) (permitting termination of parental rights against parents who
have been imprisoned for a period of five or more years); LA. CHILD CODE art. 1015(6)
(West 1996) (allowing termination of parental rights after two years of incarceration);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A-19b(3)(h) (1997) (considering termination where “[t]he parent
is imprisoned for such a period that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a pe-
riod exceeding [two] years, and the parent has not provided for the child’s proper care and
custody and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will”); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-
309(a)(iv) (Michie 1997) (providing for termination of parental rights where the parent is
incarcerated for a felony and is deemed unfit to have custody of the child).
42. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(d)(1) (1997). The new statute does not define what consti-
tutes a substantial portion of time. By not providing a definition, the Legislature has
given the judiciary the discretion to adapt the rule to the particular facts of each case.
Other state statutes have defined the length of incarceration considered detrimental to
the child in a similar manner. However, some states have specifically defined the length of
incarceration considered detrimental to the child. For example, Colorado allows for termi-
nation of parental rights when a parent will not be “eligible for parole for at least six years
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the child attains eighteen years of age.43 To terminate the incarcer-
ated parent’s rights, a court must deem the parent to be a violent ca-
reer criminal, a habitual felony offender, or a sexual predator.44 Par-
ents convicted of first- or second-degree murder, sexual battery con-
stituting a capital, life, or first-degree felony, or parents who have
been convicted of a substantially similar offense in another jurisdic-
tion may also have their rights terminated under the new statute.45
The state must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that continu-
ing the parental relationship with that incarcerated parent would be
harmful to the child and, for this reason, that termination of the pa-
rental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the
child.”46
The new statute also amended section 39.469, Florida Statutes ,
allowing the parental rights of only one of the parents to be termi-
nated when that parent is incarcerated.47 The court will enter an or-
der terminating the rights of the incarcerated parent and place the
child in the custody of the remaining parent.48
Chapter 97-226, Florida Laws, also amended section 61.13, Flor-
ida Statutes, which addresses child custody and support following
dissolution of marriage. Florida law has a preference for shared pa-
rental responsibility following dissolution of marriage.49 However,
under the new statute, incarceration of a parent meeting the re-
quirements of section 39.464(1)(d), Florida Statutes , creates a rebut-
table presumption against granting shared parental responsibility in
dissolution of marriage proceedings.50 However, the convicted parent
is not relieved of the duty to financially provide for the child.51
Moreover, a parent may seek to completely terminate the incarcer-
ated parent’s parental rights in accordance with section 39.464(1),
Florida Statutes.
                                                                                                                   
after the date the child was adjudicated dependent or neglected.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-
604(1)(b)(III) (1997).
43. See FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(d)(1) (1997).
44. See id. § 39.464(1)(d)(2).
45. See id.
46. Id. § 39.464(1)(d)(3).
47. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-226, Fla. Laws 3926 (amending FLA. STAT. §
39.469(4) (1995), codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.469(6)(1997)).
48. See id.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (2)(b)(2) (1997).
50. See id.
51. See id. (stating “the convicted parent is not relieved of any obligation to provide
financial support”).
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IV.   THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALLOWING INCARCERATION TO
SERVE AS GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
In Santosky v. Kramer ,52 the United States Supreme Court held
that “freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a funda-
mental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”53
In Padgett v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ,54 the
Florida Supreme Court adopted the holding of Santosky and further
held that “this interest is especially implicated in proceedings involv-
ing termination of parental rights.”55 Therefore, courts apply a very
strict standard of review when determining whether termination of
parental rights will violate a parent’s right to either substantive or
procedural due process.56
A.   Substantive Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has determined that funda-
mental rights are incorporated within the liberty provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.57 The Court has
stated that this right to liberty “denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right . . . to marry, establish a home and
bring up children.”58 Therefore, courts must apply a high standard of
review when deciding whether a state’s intrusion into a citizen’s pri-
vate life, for example, by terminating parental rights, violates the
parent’s substantive due process rights.59 The standard of review in
such a case is whether the challenged law serves a compelling state
interest, and whether it accomplishes its goal through the least in-
trusive means possible.60
                                                                                                                   
52. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
53. Id. at 753.
54. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
55. Id. at 570.
56. See id. at 571. 
57. Substantive due process jurisprudence originated from cases such as Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925). The concept of privacy with regard to family matters extends from the landmark
decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973), in which the Court found a
“penumbra” of rights in the Constitution guaranteeing privacy regarding matters within
the realm of the family. In Florida, the protection extended to this liberty interest in the
context of the family stems from the privacy provision of article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Family Law and Children, HB 1111 (1997) Staff
Analysis 4 (June 13, 1997) (on file with comm.); see also Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271,
1276 (Fla. 1996) (holding that a state may only intrude upon the parents’ fundamental
right to raise their children when the children are threatened by harm).
58. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Hroncich v. Department of HRS, 667 So. 2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA
1995) (holding that in light of the fact that the mother’s mental illness could be controlled
through medication, termination of parental rights was not the least intrusive means to
prevent harm to the child).
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The Florida Supreme Court applied this standard of review in
Beagle v. Beagle.61 Beagle concerned a statute that allowed grand-
parent visitation where either one or both parents prohibited a rela-
tionship between the minor child and the grandparents.62 The par-
ents objected to the grandparents’ court-awarded visitation rights
under the statute and challenged the statute’s constitutionality.63
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the parents and held that
the state may not intrude upon the fundamental rights of parents to
raise their children except in cases where the children are threat-
ened with harm.64
Further, in Padgett, the Florida Supreme Court stated that
“before parental rights in a child can be permanently and involun-
tarily severed, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence
that reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of signifi-
cant harm to the child.”65 Therefore, the Florida courts can sever a
parent’s rights to his or her child if it can be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that substantial risk of harm is posed to the
child if the parent’s rights are not terminated,66 and that termination
of parental rights is the least restrictive means of preventing harm
to the child. If those standards are met, the termination can proceed
without violating the parent’s substantive due process rights.67
1.   Does Incarceration of a Parent Pose a Substantial Risk of
Harm to the Child?
Incarceration of a parent cannot be used to show abandonment,68
but can it by inference be used to show a substantial risk of future
harm to the child?
If a parent is incarcerated for a substantial portion of time, and is
thus unable to assume meaningful parental responsibilities, detri-
ment to the child could occur.69 In Palmer v. Department of Health
                                                                                                                   
61. 678 So. 2d 1271 (1996).
62. See id. at 1273; FLA. STAT. § 752.01(1)(e) (1997).
63. See Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1273.
64. See id. at 1277 (holding that the interest of parents in determining the care and
upbringing of their children free from governmental interference is a longstanding and
fundamental liberty interest).
65. Padgett v. Department of HRS, 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
66. See id. (holding that the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
“reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child”);
FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(d)(3) (1997).
67. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (stating
that a state may violate privacy interests, but it must use the least restrictive means pos-
sible when so doing).
68. See supra note 22.
69. See H.R. Comm. on Family Law and Children, HB 1111 (1997) Staff Analysis 4
(June 13, 1997) (on file with comm.).
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and Rehabilitative Services ,70 a court found a father’s diagnosed pe-
dophilia, which had not been treated and had no prospects of suc-
cessful treatment, to be sufficient grounds to terminate his parental
rights.71 The Court stated that in this situation, the propensity for
future behavior that would adversely affect the child could be rea-
sonably predicted.72   
The legislative intent behind the new statute seems clear. A par-
ent incarcerated for a substantial period of time prior to the child
turning eighteen cannot meaningfully participate in the upbringing
of the child. The 1997 Legislature sought to prevent a child from
languishing in foster care, unable to be adopted into a stable, nurtur-
ing environment because a long-term incarcerated parent will not
relinquish his or her parental rights. In these instances, substantial
harm would occur to the child. The child’s best interests would be
better served by terminating the incarcerated parent’s rights, and
allowing the child to live in a more stable family environment.73
Moreover, the Legislature considered the harm some children,
such as Justin Taylor, would undoubtedly suffer by having to visit a
parent who has been incarcerated for committing a violent crime.74
For example, in Justin’s situation, the revelation that his step-father
was not his natural father and that his natural father was in jail for
murder could damage his emotional well-being. Additionally, visiting
incarcerated parents would subject children to an emotionally un-
healthy environment and perhaps desensitize them to incarceration.
2.   Is Termination of Parental Rights the Least Intrusive Means of
Preventing Harm?
Termination of parental rights appears to be the most drastic step
that the state can take. Because the least intrusive means standard
is very fact specific, one must apply it on a case-by-case basis. There-
fore, in the context of termination of parental rights, courts must de-
termine if anything short of termination would effectively achieve
                                                                                                                   
70. 547 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
71. See id. at 984.
72. See id.
73. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.464, 39.4611 (1997); Padgett v. Department of HRS, 577 So.
2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991).
74. In considering the psychological effect that children might experience when visit-
ing an incarcerated parent, the rationale promulgated in Palmer v. Department of HRS
regarding prospective abuse seems applicable. In Palmer, the court opined that the father
had no reasonable hope of successfully completing the treatment, much less completing
the treatment within a reasonable time. Because of this, the court reasoned that the
child’s emotional and physical well-being were placed at risk. See Palmer, 547 So. 2d at
984; see also supra text accompanying note 36 (stating that Justin Taylor would suffer
emotional trauma if his mother told him that his natural father was in jail for murder and
the only father he ever knew, his step-father, was not his real father).
1998]                         TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 345
the compelling state interest of preventing substantial harm to a
child.
In many cases, termination of parental rights is the only means
available to protect the child from harm. For example, in In re DJS
and JSG,75 the children were left without a permanent home due to
the father’s refusal to relinquish his parental rights.76 The court
considered the father’s prior incarceration and his past history of
abuse and neglect in deeming termination of parental rights the only
viable solution.77 It stands to reason that if a less intrusive means
were available to protect the children from harm, the court would
have used it.
At times, courts have reversed lower courts’ termination of paren-
tal rights, finding that less intrusive means existed. In Hroncich v.
Department of HRS ,78 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed a
trial court’s termination of parental rights because authorities failed
to prove neglect by clear and convincing evidence.79 The court noted
that the mother’s schizophrenia accounted for her initial lack of
compliance with the performance agreement.80 Additionally, the
court noted that medication would stabilize her mental condition.81
Therefore, the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental
rights was not the least intrusive means that could be taken to pro-
tect the child.82
There is no bright-line rule for courts to use when determining
whether or not termination of parental rights is the least intrusive
means of preventing harm to a child. Therefore, courts must base
such decisions on the facts of each particular case, including whether
the parent is now, or may at some future time be, a danger to the
child, or has abused, abandoned, or neglected the child to the extent
that termination is the only viable option left to the state.83
                                                                                                                   
75. 563 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
76. See id. at 660.
77. See id. at 662-70 (considering factors such as the father’s prior arrest for child
abuse and his frequent failure to properly supervise his children, which resulted in a
three-year-old child who often whimpered, stared into space, and was unable to feed him-
self or use the bathroom by himself).
78. 667 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
79. See id. at 808 (noting that prospective neglect is proven through evidence when
“a parent’s past conduct [] or current mental condition makes the risk of future harm to
the child likely”).
80. See id. at 806.
81. See id. at 806-07.
82. See id. at 807.
83. Compare id. with Palmer v. Department of HRS, 547 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1989) (finding a father’s untreated pedophilia to be grounds to terminate parental
rights).
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B.   Procedural Due Process
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 84 the United States Supreme Court
stated that government may not deprive an individual of a liberty or
property interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments without the benefit of procedures designed to prevent
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the right in question.85 The Court
promulgated a test designed to ensure that proper procedures were
followed prior to the deprivation of substantive property rights.86
While children are certainly not property, the test is equally appli-
cable to the protection of liberty interests, which include parental
rights.87 The test provides that a court should consider three factors
when examining the constitutional sufficiency of administrative pro-
cedures prior to the initial termination of fundamentally protected
rights.88 Courts will consider:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional pro-
cedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedures would entail.89
Extensive procedural safeguards are currently in place in Florida
to prevent the erroneous deprivation of parental rights.90 First,
“[w]hen a petition for termination of parental rights has been filed,
the clerk of the court shall set the case before the court for an advi-
sory hearing.”91 The parents must be served with the petition.92 The
court must advise the parents before the adjudicatory hearing that
they have a right to counsel,93 and the court must continue to advise
the parents of their right to counsel at each stage of the proceeding.94
The court, if necessary, will determine if the parents knowingly and
intelligently waived their right to counsel.95 The court will then set
an adjudicatory hearing within forty-five days of the advisory hear-
                                                                                                                   
84. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
85. See id. at 321.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See FLA. STAT. § 39.467(1) (1997).
91. Id. § 39.461(3).
92. See id. § 39.462(1)(a)(1)(1)-(2).
93. See id. § 39.463.
94. See id. § 39.465(1)(a). This section further states that no waiver will be accepted
by the court where it appears that the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child is unable
to make an intelligent choice on the matter because of mental condition, age, education,
experience, the nature and complexity of the case, or other factors the court might deem
relevant. See id.
95. See id. § 39.466(1).
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ing.96 Only when the petitioner has proven his or her case by clear
and convincing evidence, will parental rights be terminated.97
While the parents’ privacy interest in continuing the parent-child
relationship is substantial,98 the law’s detailed procedural require-
ments minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation.99 Additionally, the
new statute’s failure to specifically define the required period of in-
carceration100 further protects the parent’s procedural due process
rights because courts will not be constrained by an arbitrary time
limit.101
V.   JUDICIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING FLORIDA’S INCAR-
CERATION-AS-GROUNDS-FOR-TERMINATION STATUTE
In Florida, judges are given a great deal of discretion in depend-
ency and child custody cases. The new statute continues that tradi-
tion. However, in practice, incarceration and felony convictions were
already considered by judges in dependency and custody cases.102
The main effect of the new statute is the weight those factors will be
given, as they now must receive official consideration by judges con-
sidering termination of parental rights.103
The first difficulty judges will face is determining the meaning of
the term “substantial portion” with regard to the amount of time the
parent is incarcerated before the child reaches majority.104 The new
statute does not state what qualifies as a substantial portion of
time.105 Other state statutes have codified six years as a substantial
portion of time.106 For example, Arizona’s statute, like Florida’s, does
                                                                                                                   
96. See id. § 39.466(3).
97. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
98. See supra Part IV.A.
99. See FLA. STAT. § 39.462 (1997).
100. See id. § 39.464(1)(d)(1).
101. See id. § 39.4612(2) (requiring courts to consider the parent’s ability to provide
the child with “food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care . . . and other material
needs of the child”); id. § 39.4612(3) (noting that courts will inquire into the parent’s ca-
pacity to “care for the child to the extent that the child’s health and well-being will not be
endangered upon the child’s return home”); see also B.W. v. Department of HRS, 498 So.
2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1986) (holding that the father, despite his incarceration, had not aban-
doned his children because he attempted to maintain contact with them); In re DJS and
JSG, 563 So. 2d 655, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (considering the father’s past incarcerations
as evidence of prospective abuse of his children) (quoting In re Baby Boy A, 544 So. 2d
1136, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 39.464 (1997).
103. See supra Part III.
104. See supra Part III; FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(d)(1) (1997).
105. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(III) (1997) (providing that at least six
years of incarceration is required to terminate parental rights); see also LA. CHILD. CODE
art. 1015(6)(a), (d) (West 1996) (stating that the child must have been in the custody of the
Department of Health and Human Services for at least two years, and that the parent
must have at least five more years of forthcoming incarceration).
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-533(B)(4) (1997).
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not set a specific time period.107 Arizona’s statute states in part that
parental rights may be terminated when the parent has been incar-
cerated for a felony offense that carries a sentence of such length
that the child would be deprived of a normal home “for a period of
years.”108
Despite this precedent from a state with a similar statute, there
are likely to be differing opinions among Florida judges concerning
what constitutes a substantial period of time. It can be anticipated,
however, that the older the child and the longer the child has had a
relationship with the incarcerated parent, the less likely the court
will sever the relationship.
Moreover, in a chapter 61 proceeding regarding shared parental
responsibility, it is presumed that incarceration of a parent is detri-
mental to best interests of the child.109 In a chapter 39 proceeding,
however, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
continuing the relationship would be detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the child. To overcome the state’s evidence, the incarcerated
parent will need to show financial support; meaningful involvement
in the child’s life such as participation and interest in school and
athletic activities; actual physical care for the child such as bathing
and feeding; and professed expressions of affection for the child prior
to the period of incarceration.110 The child’s wishes, particularly
those of older children, may be considered in some cases.111
While it is difficult to say how many termination for incarceration
cases will be presented to the courts, it seems doubtful that there
will be large numbers.112 Any amount, however, presents logistical
                                                                                                                   
107. See id.
108. In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-5609, 720 P.2d 548, 551
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that five years of incarceration constituted a sufficient period
of time to deprive a father of his parental rights).
109. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(b)(2) (1997).
110. See, e.g., In re B.W. v. Department of HRS, 498 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1986). In
this case, the father was incarcerated. The state attempted to terminate his parental
rights on abandonment grounds. The Florida Supreme Court denied the request to termi-
nate the father’s rights, partially on the grounds that the father repeatedly asked the HRS
caseworkers and the foster parents to bring the children to the prison for visits. The fa-
ther also wrote his children regularly. He also wrote the HRS workers, the foster parents,
and school officials, inquiring about and expressing concern for the welfare of the children.
As one of the requirements of abandonment in Florida is the failure to communicate with
the children, the court refused to terminate parental rights in light of the father’s at-
tempted communication. See id.
111. If a younger child has a deep attachment to an incarcerated parent, deprivation
of that parent could be more detrimental to the child than allowing the incarcerated par-
ent to maintain parental rights. With an older child, the same principle applies, but an
older child is presumably more emotionally secure, and therefore more able to make a ra-
tional decision about personal needs.
112. Courts will have to consider whether an appropriate home is available for the
child. Courts will probably be less likely to sever parental rights if the child will merely
languish in the state’s foster care system. As with all adoptions, younger children have a
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problems for the courts and prisons as they must ensure that prison-
ers are informed of and able to participate in the termination hear-
ings. In the Colorado case of In re C.G.,113 an incarcerated father filed
suit against the state on the grounds that the state’s refusal to
transport him at state expense to his termination hearing was a
violation of his right to procedural due process.114 The Colorado
Court of Appeals held that the denial was not a violation of the fa-
ther’s due process rights as he was represented by counsel prior to
and during the hearing, and he was given the opportunity to present
testimony by deposition or affidavit.115
From the judges’ standpoint, the new statute has essentially
added another criteria—that of felony incarceration for a substantial
period of time—to the list of factors that are considered in the termi-
nation of parental rights. The new statute provides judges with the
opportunity to further ensure that the best interests of Florida’s
children are upheld.
VI.   POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NEW STATUTE
Most likely, courts will not apply the new statute in a uniform
manner because of its lack of specificity regarding the requisite in-
carceration period. On the one hand, this lack of specificity will
permit authorities to manipulate the statute to fit the particular cir-
cumstances of each case. On the other hand, authorities will not
have concrete guidelines by which they can judge their actions. This
problem can be easily remedied by adding a specific time period to
the statute, thus making its application and effect uniform through-
out the state. However, such an addition subverts the Legislature’s
intent of granting judges discretion when dealing with the facts of
individual cases.116
                                                                                                                   
greater chance of being adopted than older children. In 1996-1997, there were 532 chil-
dren below age five awaiting adoption after termination of parental rights. There were
858 children between the ages of six and 12 and 281 children between the ages of 13 and
15 awaiting adoption. Finally, only 51 children between the ages of 16 and 18 were
awaiting adoption after termination of parental rights. The breakdowns in ages of chil-
dren actually adopted were not available from the Department of Children and Families.
However, one can assume that the Department is not seeking termination of parental
rights in the cases of older children because it will be harder to place them in permanent
homes. Moreover, because there are such large numbers of younger children available for
adoption, one must wonder how likely it is that the state will seek to add to the pool of
children awaiting good homes. See DEPARTMENT OF CHILD. AND FAM., ADOPTION AND
RELATED SERVICES ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT (1996-1997); see also FLA. STAT. §
39.4611(1)(c)(6) (1997) (requiring the court to consider the likelihood that an older child
will remain in long-term foster care).
113. 885 P.2d 355 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
114. See id. at 357.
115. See id.
116. Telephone Interview with Peggy Sanford, Staff Attorney for the Florida House of
Representatives Committee on Children and Family Law (September 15, 1997). Ms. San-
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Certain “functional” problems also exist regarding the inclusion of
incarcerated parents in termination of parental rights proceedings.
Transporting prisoners and scheduling hearings will have to be
strictly monitored to ensure that, for procedural due process, an in-
carcerated parent can be present at proceedings if desired.117 A
statutory provision defining procedures for those situations would
enable the judiciary to more effectively apply the new statute in a
constitutionally valid manner.
VII.   CONCLUSION
The addition of incarceration as grounds for termination of paren-
tal rights presents many meaningful questions. As the constitu-
tionality of the new statute seems secure, the most profound impact
of the statute will be its effect on the judiciary. The new statute al-
lows the courts an additional means by which parental rights can be
terminated. However, it presents uncertainty, as courts must de-
termine what length of sentence justifies termination, and whether
the termination is truly in the child’s best interest.
Perhaps Chief Justice Shaw stated it best when he said “While we
are loath to sanction government interference in the sacrosanct par-
ent-child relationship, we are more reluctant still to forsake the wel-
fare of our youth. Florida’s children are simply too important.”118 In
spite of the difficulties that will come, if the new statute protects
even one child from harm it can be considered a success.
                                                                                                                   
ford stated that the Legislature purposely did not promulgate a specific time limit because
it was impossible to cover every possible situation. Ms. Sanford explained that the Legis-
lature left the time limit to the court’s discretion to apply it to the facts of each case.
117. See supra Part IV.B. Incarcerated parents do not have statutory right to attend
hearings as long as they can participate by phone. Courts do not transport prisoners in-
carcerated for serious felony offenses such as murder.
118. Padgett v. Department of HRS, 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
